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MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS: NEW
APPROACHES TO FINANCING AND
STRUCTURING VENTURES
by Lewis D. Solomon*
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTINATIONAL AGRIBUSINESS CORPORATIONS possess a
considerable body of expertise, including managerial, technical and
marketing skills. These businesses also enjoy ready access to capital re-
sources. Third World nations face a variety of critical tasks in feeding
their population including increasing the output of food (crops, meat and
fish) to achieve a greater degree of self-sufficiency, fighting crop and
animal diseases and reducing the loss and waste of food. In addition to
satisfying their food needs and seeking balanced developmental programs,
Third World countries strive to fulfill some or all of the following objec-
tives: increasing employment, improving the distribution of income and
land, reducing (or at least minimizing the gain in) energy consumption,
and pursuing ecologically sound development paths.
The image (and the reality) of corporate exploitation, the skewing of
developmental priorities, and the adversarial confrontation between
Third World nations and industrialized countries, characterized by pro-
ducing nations attempting to stabilize and raise the prices of raw materi-
als, creates a multitude of tensions between developing countries and
multinational corporations. The profit-making objectives of multinational
corporations have, in the past, conflicted with the development goals of
Third World countries.
There are numerous "horror" stories illustrating the clash between
the profit motive of business and the social goals of Third World nations.
The manufacturers of farm inputs, such as tractors and agricultural
chemicals, have had an interest, as one American corporate executive can-
didly admitted, in a nation's wealthy agricultural sector. He noted: "We
benefit the wealthy landlords and the ruling class."" Multinational firms
skew a country's developmental priorities, such as redistribution of in-
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. B.A.
(1963) Cornell University; J.D. (1966) Yale University.
I gratefully acknovlddge the financial assistance of the Travel and Maintenance Pro-
gram of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Because of the candid and extremely sensitive nature of the in-depth interviews with
executives of multinational agribusiness firms, certain statements in this article will not be
attributed to specific individuals or firms.
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come. Absent stringent governmental regulation, small farmers generally
fail to benefit from the new technology introduced by multinational
agribusiness giants. Multinational corporations may also divert crops to
the production of animal feed thus reducing the total amount of the al-
ready scarce protein supply available for human consumption. This im-
pacts particularly upon a nation's poor.2 The growing of crops for export
to the table of the world's elite, as part of a multinational contract pro-
duction scheme, probably will force a developing country to expend
scarce foreign exchange to import basic foodstuffs-wheat, rice and corn.
The cornucopia of the consumer society heralded by multinational
business poses other problems for a developing country. Firms have suc-
cessfully promoted, through advertising campaigns, food products such as
soft drinks which provide little, if any, nutritional value yet drain dispos-
able income of individuals who can ill afford to waste money.3 Food or
beverages developed for richer consumer-oriented societies may displace
more nutritious, traditional foods, especially among lower income con-
sumers. Bottle formula for infants is expensive in terms of a nation's av-
erage earning power. It also creates severe health hazards among the
poor. The probability of over-dilution of the formula to stretch utilization
produces an inadequacy of nutrients. The serving of contaminated
formula in bacteria-laden bottles led one organization to identify infant
milk formula as a "baby killer" in developing nations.s ' Detailing such
2 For example, the poultry feed activities of Ralston Purina in Columbia diverted land
from the cultivation of pulses to animal feed crops thereby decreasing the ability of Colum-
bia to meet its domestic protein requirements. R. LEDOGAR, HUNGRY FOR PROFITS, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG MULTINATIONALS IN LATIN AMERICA 94-98 (1975). CPC International Inc. collabo-
rated with the U. S. and Pakistan governments to raise the yields of corn in Pakistan. Yields
were increased through the introduction of new inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, and furnish-
ing of technicians, but CPC processed corn into corn sweetener for soft drinks consumed by
urban middle and upper classes. See generally, Harvard Business School, Rafham Maize
Products Co. Ltd. Case (1-576-237).
1 R. LEDOGAR, HUNGRY FOR PROFITS, U. S. FOOD & DRUG MULTINATIONALS IN LATIN
AMERICA ch. 8 (1975); P. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH, THE POWER OF THE MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 182-184 (1974).
3-1 R. LEDOGAR, HUNGRY FOR PROFITS, U. S. FOOD & DRUG MULTINATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA ch. 9 (1975). See also Jelliffe, Commerciogenic Malnutrition? 30 NUTRITION RE-
VIEWS 199 (1972); Wade, Bottle Feeding: Adverse Effects of a Western Technology, 184
SCIENCE 45 (1974); Helsing, The Uses and Abuses of Baby Food, 8 CERES 57 (1975). The
promotional efforts used by infant milk formula firms include: milk nurses who visit new
mothers in hospital maternity wards and in their homes; milk banks which sell infant milk
in hospitals and clinics at discount prices to poverty group mothers, and promotion by
health professionals in health institutions through a variety of means including posters,
baby care pamphlets, vaccination cards, and the use of formula in hospitals. See generally
Ted Greiner, The Promotion of Bottle Feeding by Multinational Corporations: How Adver-
tising and the Health Professions Have Contributed, CORNELL INTERNATIONAL NUTRITION
MONOGRAPH SERIES No. 2 (1975).
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corporate "horror" stories is not, however, the purpose of this article.
Rather, the inquiry is whether it is possible to channel the expertise
of multinational agribusiness corporations into projects providing social
benefits to developing nations. Two routes appear viable. First, private
expertise, in fields such as technology, know-how, management, and mar-
keting, could be fused with public sector financing capabilities to meet
the needs of the Third World. This is the so-called "triangulation strat-
egy." Second, either apart from or in conjunction with public sector
financing, a systems approach to large scale multi-function development
projects involving a consortium of firms could be utilized. The systems
technique and consortium approach grow out of the awareness that no
one corporation may want to or be able to provide all the requisite exper-
tise or to handle the implementation of a project by itself.
II. NEW APPROACHES TO STRUCTURING VENTURES IN THE THIRD WORLD
Multinational corporations have grown more flexible in structuring
their activities in Third World countries. In the past, agribusiness firms
emphasized two strategies: (1) owning large tracts of land, so-called plan-
tations or estates, in developing nations to grow crops for export, pri-
marily to developed countries and (2) funneling foreign direct investment
(apart from the growing of agricultural produce) through wholly owned
and controlled subsidiaries in Third World countries. With respect to the
first strategy, as part of an emerging awareness by developing nations of
the value of their natural resources and an increasing availability of infor-
mation regarding the impact of multinational firms engaged in raw ma-
terial exploitation, including agricultural crops, governments rejected
foreign ownership of plantations. The plantation system was perceived as
creating economic, social and political obstacles to development.4 Land
' The major economic obstacles include: (1) inequality in the distribution of wealth and
income; (2) reduction in the supply of funds available for reinvestment because of remit-
tance of interest and dividends; (3) the rigid canalization of linkages and the thwarting of
development production, for example, the foregoing of livestock production; (4) the low skill
nature of plantation labor which inhibits the improvement of labor inputs or the creation of
skills useful in other sectors; (5) the utilization of payments for imported capital goods and
consumer goods, especially imported food, which rebound to the advantage of countries
from which the goods are imported and plantation economies facing a perpetual balance of
payment problem stemming from declining terms of trade; and (6) resources which are not
deployed to higher-income generating activities. Social and political obstacles to develop-
ment emanating from the impact of a plantation economy include: (1) a rigid social struc-
ture inhibiting human mobility; (2) a correlation between race and class creating a caste
system and generating social tension and inability; (3) the planters and their associate
groups utilize their power to serve the interests of a small elite group; (4) an authoritarian
tradition preventing co-operative, participative decision-making at work, in politics and so-
ciety; (5) individualism contributing to clashes of interest in interpersonal relations; (6)
198n
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came to be regarded as a national patrimony which should be locally
owned-either privately or in the hands of the state. As a wave of nation-
alism swept across the Third World, at least with regard to land owner-
ship, multinational firms were forced to abandon their extensive land-
holdings. Firms were not permitted to own plantations, which in any
event, even before nationalization, were regarded as captive because of
governmental policies which increased wages, fixed selling prices and con-
trolled export prices. 5
Sophisticated firms with expertise in tropical crops, such as sugar,
gained through previous ownership of plantations, turned to a variety of
techniques to turn their knowledge into a new corporate profit-making
center. Leading multinational sugar companies, typified by the English-
based firms, Booker McConnell, and Tate & Lyle, pursued a similar pat-
tern of establishing consulting arms, including agricultural, technical and
engineering services. In addition to setting up sugar estates, managing
sugar growing and processing operations on a contractual basis, these
firms engage in a variety of consulting activities outside the field of sugar.
Booker McConnell and Tate & Lyle also diversified into the construction
of agricultural machinery.6
weak community structure and loose family organization preventing the growth of viable
local governmental units; (7) a "great house" value system emphasizing the consumption of
imported luxuries and the investment in nonproductive assets. G. L. BECKFORD, PERSISTENT
POVERTY UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN PLANTATION ECONOMIES OF THE THIRD WORLD 213-217
(1972). See also Watters, Sugar Production and Culture Change in Fiji-A Comparison
Between Peasant and Plantation Agriculture, 4 PACIFIC VIEWPOINT 25 (1963). Among the
last plantation system holdouts is Gulf & Western Industries Inc. which has extensive sugar
holdings in the Dominican Republic. Riding, The Carribean Role of G. & W., N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1975, at 47, col. 1; Riding, Balaquer and His Firm Ally, the U.S., are Targets of
Dominican Unrest, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1976, at 6, col. 3.
5 Interview with Sir George Bishop (May 4, 1976). In an attempt to stave off nationali-
zation, Booker McConnell responded to changing political and nationalistic sentiment in
Guyana by adopting a wide-ranging corporate responsibility program. Litvak & Maule, For-
eign Corporate Social Responsibility in Less Developed Countries, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L.
121 (1975). Guyana nationalized the sugar holdings of Booker McConnell in May, 1976.
Chamberlain, Guyana Takes Over Bookers, Manchester Guardian, June 6, 1976, at 8;
BOOKER MCCONNELL LTD., REPORT AND ACCOUNTS, 8-9 (1975). J. Thompson, Managing Di-
rector of Brooke Bond Liebig, Ltd., provided an interesting comnientary on the ownership
and operation of tea plantations in Sri Lanka prior to nationalization. He stated that the
plantation operations had been losing money for 10 years. The company faced what he cate-
gorized as an "intolerable situation" because plantations came under the jurisdiction of
three different ministries. Because of inter-ministry conflicts, the plantations exported two
types of tea in the face of a growing worldwide movement for uniformity. Interview, J.
Thompson (May 3, 1976).
6 Interviews with Sir George Bishop, Chairman, Industry Cooperative Program (May 4,
1976); J. F. P. Tate, Director, Tate & Lyle Ltd. (May 5, 1976). See also BOOKER MCCONNELL
LTD., REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 13, 39, 43 (1975); BOOKER IN AGRICULTURE; TATE & LYLE LTD.
ANNUAL REPORT 9-10 (1975); TATE & LYLE LTD., A COMPANY AND ITS WORLD; TATE & LYLE
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The example of Booker McConnell in Kenya is illustrative of the
trend to the redeployment of expertise. After taking over the ownership
of land, many governments came to realize the complexities of growing
and processing sugar. The government of Kenya, facing troublesome diffi-
culties with a nationalized sugar estate, asked Booker McConnell with a
worldwide reputation for expertise in sugar growing and processing, for
advice. The advisory relationship blossomed into Booker McConnell man-
aging the estate. When government of Kenya then decided to look for
new areas to be planted with sugar, it asked Booker McConnell to pre-
pare a feasibility study and pilot project. This effort by Booker McCon-
nell culminated in the development of the Mumias plantation. The estate
project combines, by contract, the management skills of a multinational
firm with the resources, the land, and the manpower of a developing
country. Booker McConnell presently manages and provides technical ad-
vice for the Mumias project.7
Beyond the direct growing of agricultural produce, agribusiness firms
have shifted their approach to structuring ventures involving the process-
ing of agricultural products. Under governmental pressure to increase lo-
cal ownership and management and "disassemble the package," that is,
separate the organization, management, technology and access to mar-
kets, from foreign capital, firms responded with a variety of new business
arrangements including joint ventures, minority investments, manage-
ment and operating contracts, licensing agreements, and consulting ar-
rangements. The focus by developing countries on shifting the ownership
position held by multinational enterprises may obscure the effort of
global entities to maintain control over foreign ventures in which they
participate.
In a typical situation, a French firm, Pien & Glasson, established a
joint venture for meat processing in Brazil, including a slaughter-house
for sheep and cattle and cold storage facilities to be used by the joint
LTD., ENGINEERING. The diversification of Booker McConnell and Tate & Lyle into agricul-
tural machinery preceded the nationalization of their landholdings. BooKER MCCONNELL
LTD., REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 13 (1975); TATE & LYLE LTD., ENGINEERING. Consulting ar-
rangements may involve reimbursement for time and knowledge of a firm's experts, a disclo-
sure fee for the sale of knowledge, and possibly equity sweeteners priced in terms of what a
firm's competitors would charge and what it would cost a local group (public or private) to
acquire the expertise. The difficulties in negotiating a consulting contract should not be
minimized as clients often underestimate the value of knowledge inputs into operations.
Interviews with Guy Knapton, Coordinator, New Business Development, CPC Europe, Ltd.
(May 10, 1976); Dr. A. Goedhart, Managing Director, Verenigide H. V. A. Maatschappijen
N.V. (May 12, 1976).
7 Interview with Sir George Bishop (May 4, 1976); BOOKER MCCONNELL LTD., SUGAR
FROM MUMIAS; COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 81 (1975).
Booker McConnell holds a 5% equity interest in the Mumias project. BOOKER MCCONNELL
LTD., REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS 39 (1975).
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venture and others. Pien & Glasson had a thirty percent equity interest
with a private Brazilian investor holding the remainder. In addition to its
role as an investor, Pien & Glasson also provides technical assistance, in-
cluding an engineer who planned the plant, ordered equipment and su-
pervised construction; a managing director with commercial and market-
ing expertise for the operation; and another individual with technical
expertise in meat processing. It is also expected that the joint venture,
using Pien & Glasson as a marketing outlet, will sell exports to and
through the French firm. The allocation of decision-making in the joint
venture is important. Major decisions, such as investments, export prod-
ucts and the use of the cold storage facility, are jointly made by the Presi-
dent of Pien & Glasson and the President of the Brazilian partner in the
joint venture. Another Brazilian, who is the nominee of the Brazilian joint
venture partner, serves as Chairman of the Board and handles the admin-
istrative organization of the operation. A French managing director desig-
nated by Pien & Glasson supervises daily management of the venture in-
cluding commercial and technical operation.'
III. TAPPING PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCING
Multinational firms are cognizant of the risks and uncertainties at-
tendant in foreign direct investment, such as nationalization, a limitation
on the repatriation of profits, and exchange controls. Thus they seek to
reduce further their risks by fusing their expertise with public sector
financing. Tapping public funds, provided by a regional development
bank, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, or a national
agency of a developed country such as the United Kingdom's Common-
wealth Development Corporation, reduces or obviates the need for a firm
to invest capital-an asset in increasingly short supply. Funds from pub-
lic sector national and regional development banks may be joined with
private sector expertise. Public sector organizations may also assist in the
implementation of a project.
The construction of a powder milk plant in Nicaragua illustrates the
possibilities for beneficial cooperation between a private multinational
corporation, Nestle, 9 a public sector regional development bank, the In-
8 Interview with J. LeBlanc, Pien & Glasson (May 14, 1976). Substantial funds, in the
form of debt instruments, were provided by a Brazilian regional development bank, with the
Government of Brazil and the World Bank then refinancing the loan. The venture faces two
difficulties: (1) a supply problem caused by a lack of a sufficient quantity of cows in Brazil;
and (2) a quality problem because Brazilian cattle are regarded as "too fat" by French stan-
dards thereby permitting only the exportation of beef and pork cuts, not carcasses, and
delicatessen products.
" In developing countries, Nestle tries, when possible, to establish wholly owned milk
processing plants. This form of ownership gives Nestle full control over a project. If a devel-
oping country forces Nestle to establish a joint venture, Nestle insists on retaining manage-
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ter-American Development Bank, local dairy farmers, as well as local and
regional public and private sector investors.10 The venture created out of
this agribusiness package conisists of a series of apparently unrelated in-
puts-a livestock loan, an industrial credit line to finance the hardware,
an access road project and the "integration industry" provisions of the
Central American Common Market. Share ownership primarily rested in
Nestle (thirty-one percent) and a national institution financially depen-
dent on the Nicaraguan government, the Instituto do Fomento Nacional
(Infonac) (fifteen percent). The balance was held by private investors
from Nicaragua and other countries of the Central American Common
Market, the Stock-Breeders Association of Nicaragua and a Nicaraguan
financial institution. The Inter-American Development Bank granted a
loan to Infonac for the importation of machinery and equipment used in
constructing the factory, and an agricultural development loan to the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua for the construction or improvement of roads in
the local milk producing district. The Inter-American Development Bank
also made available funds to the government for pre-feasibility and feasi-
bility studies. The Nicaraguan government undertook to build a system
of roads linking the farms and the factory thereby facilitating the collec-
tion of milk. The government also advanced funds for the purchase of
cows and the improvement of grazing and milking methods.
ment responsibility and quality control. Interview with Guy Altwegg, Nestle Alimentana S.
A. (May 18, 1976).
10 Interview with Frank Meissner, Inter-American Development Bank (June 4, 1976);
See also speech by Frank Meissner, Role of Development Banks in Structuring and Imple-
menting Agricultural Projects in Proceedings, The International Food Delivery Systems
Symposium, University of California at Berkeley 44 (Sept. 1975); Nestle Alimentana S. A.,
Nestle in the Developing Countries, 66-67 (1975); W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF RE-
CENT TRENDS ch. 6 (1971).
The International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank, which finances
the growth of private enterprises in developing nations, has been involved in projects utiliz-
ing private sector expertise of firms from developed nations. THE WORLD BANK GROUP,
WASHINGTON, D.C., WORLD BANK, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 78 (Sept. 1974). See also, ARTI-
CLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, Art. I. (June 20, 1956).
Most notable is the Bud Senegal venture for production of winter fruits and vegetables for
export from Senegal to Europe. The financing was provided by the Government of Senegal,
the International Finance Corporation, a Dutch mixed private-public sector financing organ-
ization (FMO), a private sector financing group for Africa (SIFIDA), and the Western Euro-
pean private firm, the House of Bud.
The House of Bud originally controlled the management of the venture, but the firm
now handles only technical management as the venture has a Senagaese president. The
House of Bud has retained exclusive marketing rights in Europe. Other International Fi-
nance Corporation agribusiness projects involving private expertise from firms in developed
countries include sugar projects in Tanzania and Ethiopia and a cotton seed crushing mill in
Nigeria. Interview with Walter Cohn, International Finance Corporation (June 3, 1976).
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Nestle, in addition to its equity interest, provided technical and ad-
ministrative know-how to the farmers at the same time it assisted in the
construction and the operation of the factory. Nestle also licensed its
name and trademark to the venture. The structure of the board of direc-
tors and the approval requisite for board decisions gave Nestle a de facto
veto power. Nestle extended its control over the day-to-day management
of the company with the right to designate main corporate officers and to
act as exclusive marketing agent for the plant. This permitted benefits to
flow to Nestle in several forms: dividends on its equity investment which
had been highly leveraged as a result of IDB loans and funds provided by
the Nicaraguan government; a commission as selling agent; and income
from licensing its name and trademark for each pound of milk powder
produced. The success of the project meant an enterprise was now capa-
ble of supplying the countries of the Central American Common Market
with a basic consumer product-powdered milk, which previously had
been imported. Additional favorable consequences included the opening
of profitable outlets for milk produced by farmers, the construction of the
requisite infrastructure, and employment in the plant.
Governmental agencies located in developed countries in conjunction
with public sector funds made available by developing countries have
been active in financing agribusiness projects. Among the most instru-
mental has been the Coiiadonwealth Development Corporation, a British
public corporation created and funded by the British Treasury, and with
its Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and board of directors, appointed by the
Minister of Overseas Development of the United Kingdom. The Com-
monwealth Development Corporation invests funds in the development of
renewable resources of Third World countries inside and outside of the
British Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Development Corporation
has pioneered in creating structures involving private business firms in
the agribusiness ventures by using a variety of investment methods such
as wholly owned projects, equity and debt investment in partially owned
firms, loans to government and public bodies, and project patterns, par-
ticularly in conjunction with participation by local citizens.11
For example, on the Mumias project in Kenya, the majority share-
holder is the Kenya Government. Other public sector equity holders in-
clude East African Development Bank, Kenya Commercial Finance Co.,
and the Commonwealth Development Corp. Booker McConnell provided
"x Interview with A. D. Wadey, Commonwealth Development Corporation (May 3,
1976); COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE PLUS MAN-
AGEMENT (1975); COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP. REPORT AND AccouNTs 9-12 (1975).
The Commonwealth Development Corp. provides management for many of its projects and
appoints and trains local individuals to assume responsible management posts. COMMON-
WEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP. REPORT AND AccouNTs 9 (1975).
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only five percent of the equity funds. Loans and advances were provided
by the Kenya Government, Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd., Com-
monwealth Development Corporation and the private Barclays Bank In-
ternational Ltd.1" Another collaborative effort involving a private firm in-
cludes the Zambia Sugar Co. Ltd. The Commonwealth Development
Corporation provided equity and debt funds with Tate & Lyle, Ltd., also
a shareholder, furnishing management and technical consulting services.' 3
Public sector national and regional development bank funds may also
be fused with the expertise of private enterprise, for example, to tap the
forest resources in Honduras. The venture will double the foreign ex-
change earnings of Honduras and lessen its dependency on the export of
bananas. Financing sources include the Venezuelan Investment Fund (in
which Venezuela sets aside payment for oil in excess of six dollars a bar-
rel by five Central American countries for development loans to these
countries) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Funds from the
Venezuelan Investment Fund will provide the initial capital, with the in-
fra-structure highway and port facilities funded by the Inter-American
Development Bank. Private investors and the government of Honduras
will provide the remaining capital for the pulp and paper plant and saw
mills. The venture will enter into a technical assistance contract with a
foreign private corporation which will be selected to supervise the project
and provide management and expert advice.14
The emerging triangulation strategy links the management, techno-
logical and marketing expertise of global firms with third party financial
support. Increasingly, multinational firms will conceive, implement and
manage undertakings financed by a variety of public sector financial
sources including the World Bank, the International Finance Corpora-
tion, national organizations in industrialized nations, regional develop-
ment sources in the developed world such as the European Fund for De-
velopment, regional development banks such as the Inter-American
Development Bank, and financial resources available from OPEC nations.
x COMMONWEALTH D5EVELOPMENT CORP., REPORT AND AccouNTs 81 (1975); Interview
with Sir George Bishop, Chairman, ICP (May 4, 1976). Alongside the nucleus estate and
factory at Mumias, the Commonwealth Development Corp. and the Government of Kenya
are providing funds for a scheme involving small farmers, so-called "outgrowers." COMMON-
WEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., REPORT AND AccouNTs 81 (1975).
13 COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORP. REPORT AND AccouNTs 9f (1975); Interview
with J. F. P. Tate, Director, Tate & Lyle Ltd., (May 5, 1976). As part of a Nigerian project
for an irrigated sugar estate with a factory and refinery, the Commonwealth Development
Corp. has provided equity and interim financing. CDC will serve as investment coordinator
for the project and provide management and other services to the Nigerian Company spon-
soring the project. Bookers Agricultural and Technical Services Ltd. is providing consulta-
tion services in connection with the design and construction of the factory. COMMONWEALTH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., REPORT AND AccouNTs 105 (1975).
14 de Onis, Honduras Sets Up Forestry Project, N.Y. Times, 1976, at 43, col. 6.
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The development of linkages by industry, either directly or through
intermediary organizations, to the World Bank is particularly significant
in view of the Bank's present and projected financial resources 5 and its
ability to shape the development policies of other agencies. In emphasiz-
ing the economic progress of developing nations, the World Bank makes
loans to member governments or to public or private organizations which
obtain the guarantee of the government where the project to be financed
is located." After initially concentrating on the funding economic infra-
structure, including power generation and transmission, the Bank has be-
gun to finance social projects in the fields of health, population control,
education and development. 7
Except in special circumstances, the World Bank lends funds for spe-
cific projects based on an analysis consisting of feasibility studies, an ap-
praisal by a Bank staff mission and the use of consultants. The Bank also
produces annual and biannual reports on many member countries' eco-
nomic conditions and development policies and problems. These, together
with the Bank's forecasts, give a country the Bank's perception of how
things are going. The country studies are supplemented by more detailed
analyses of separate economic sectors in a nation which assess areas to
which the Bank could direct funds. These sector studies identify the
types and the location of specific projects for implementation. To assist
the Bank's management in reaching loan decisions, the Bank's country
program annually reviews individual countries and makes a case for in-
vestment projects in a specific sum.'8
'5 The World Bank has accounted for about two-thirds of total agricultural commit-
ments by multilateral development agencies (European Economic Community, Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Na-
tions Development Program, World Food Program) and nearly 40% (including bilateral aid
from developed nations) of all traditional donors. Consultive Group on Food Production and
Investment in Developing Countries 2d mtg., Feb. 10-12, 1976; Provisional Agenda, Docu-
ment D-Analysis of Resource Flows to Developing Countries in the Field of Agricul-
ture-Progress Report (FPI/76/1-5) 5 & Table 2 at 11 (Nov. 25, 1975).
16 THE WORLD BANK, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 11 (March, 1976).
' The new thrust of the Bank emanates from the Nairobi speech of Robert S. McNa-
mara, President, World Bank Group, September 24, 1973. Excerpts from the Nairobi speech
are reprinted in THE WORKD BANK, THE ASSAULT ON WORLD POVERTY PROBLEMS OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION AND HEALTH (1975) Annex 15, 90-98. The prime aim is to increase
the productivity of the poor, specifically small farmers, so that by 1985 their output will
grow by 5% per year. Address to the Board of Governors, Robert S. McNamara, President,
World Bank Group, Washington, D.C., 2-3 (Sept. 30, 1974). See also THE WORLD BANK,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 24-31 (March 1976), and Robbins, World Bank to Expand Aid for
Poorest in Rural Areas, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1975 at 1, col. 2.
" Interview with Donald Pickering, World Bank (June 3, 1976); THE WORLD BANK
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 15-16 (March, 1976) at; THE WORLD BANK GROUP, POLICIES AND
OPERATIONS 46-47 (Sept., 1974). For a discussion of project analysis and loan decision-mak-
ing see THE WORLD BANK, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 16 (March 1976); THE WORLD BANK
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Through its financial leverage, the World Bank may bring pressure
on developing nations for the adoption of policies unconnected with its
projects. In theory and to some extent in practice, the Bank achieves
what it perceives as "improvements" in the policies of a borrowing coun-
try through discussion, particularly the dialogue between the Bank's staff
and the representatives of a developing country in connection with the
preparation of reports. The report process affords the Bank a chance to
influence policy formulation. The Bank may also proceed by means of a
more determined effort to persuade a government to accept its policy po-
sition. The Bank may accelerate pressure by making it clear a country
will receive a loan only if specified conditions are met.19
Industry presently enters into the World Bank's project approach by
serving as consultants to or by supplying goods and/or services for
projects. Private sector consultants may be retained either by the Bank
itself or by the Bank's borrowers in connection with a Bank-financed pro-
ject. The Bank typically retains outside counsel on studies financed by
grants made by the Bank or by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme. 20 Apart from Bank projects, firms have been involved in various
types of consulting activities. For instance, after a country nationalizes a
foreign-owned enterprise, it may contact the Bank for help in running the
operation. The Bank may suggest that the country bring in the private
expertise, even the former foreign owner, on a management contract.21
To maintain the support of Western nations, the World Bank gener-
ally requires borrowers to obtain goods and services for Bank-financed
projects through international competitive bidding open to suppliers in
GROUP, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 47-50 (Sept., 1974). Business executives generally view the
establishment of priorities in public sector financing bodies, such as the World Bank, and
the determination of the merits of proposals, as part of a broader "political" process. Among
other cooperative programs between the Bank and various agencies of the United Nations,
the FAO and the World Bank participate, by sharing the cost of professional staff, in a
cooperative program for the identification and preparation of investment project proposals.
Recently, the FAQ/IBRD Cooperative Program has shifted from a parachuting con-
cept-dropping a number of people into a country for three to four weeks who "lay things
out" for a nation-to a bus stop technique-more frequent visits by fewer experts with the
aim of: (1) promoting more preparation by a nation in the dialogue with the FAO/World
Bank staff, which may relegate the outside experts to the role of resource people; and (2)
strengthening local institutions and identifying more local personnel capable of handling
implementation, particularly among those who have participated in the preparation of a
project. Interview with Donald Pickering, World Bank (June 3, 1976). See also, THE WORLD
BANK QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7-8 (March, 1976).
" Interview with Donald Pickering, World Bank (June 3, 1976). See also, T. HAYTER,
AID AS IMPERIALISM 72-73 (1971). Compare, THE WORLD BANK, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 20
(March, 1916).
20 WORLD BANK, USES OF CONSULTANTS BY THE WORLD BANK AND ITS BORROWERS 1-2
(April, 1974).
21 Interview with Frank E. Martin, Unilever (May 4, 1976). The example he cited in-
volved the Government of Zaire.
1980
CASE W RES. J. INT'L L.
the Bank's member countries as well as Swiss suppliers. To stimulate the
growth of local industries the Bank protects domestic bidders in a bor-
rowing country by allowing a margin of preference for local goods or
services.
22
Business executives complain about the Bank's procedures in award-
ing consulting contracts and the rigidity and bureaucratic mentality of
the Bank's staff. Firms with the capability to provide consulting, design,
and supply functions are particularly critical of the Bank. The Bank com-
piles a so-called short list of not more than five firms and then invites
these firms to submit proposals for Bank-retained consultants. This short
list is based upon firms which have expressed an interest in providing
their services, the Bank's file of firms with capabilities in various fields,23
and performance evaluations on file in the Bank regarding activities of
firms on previous projects in which the Bank was involved. A recipient
government or agency may also make deletions or additions to the Bank's
proposed list.2 The Bank's network of contracts with well-connected
firms makes the obtaining of consulting contracts nearly impossible par-
ticularly for new firms.
As the private sector plans to look increasingly to the public sector
for funding, the rigid rules of the Bank, at least as perceived by business
executives, constitute a major impediment. A key problem is the Bank's
policy against allowing a firm, if it acts in a consulting or design capacity,
from participating in any other capacity on the same project.25 The ratio-
2 Interview with Donald Pickering, World Bank (June 3, 1976); THE WORLD BANK,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 18 (March, 1976); THE WORLD BANK GROUP, POLICIES AND OPERA-
TIONS 53-54 (Sept., 1974). For example, The World Bank is lending the Government of
Tanzania $21 million to develop cashew processing plants in Tanzania to be owned by the
Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania. CashewNut Development Project Loan Agreement (Loan
No. 1014 TA), June 24, 1974, between United Republic of Tanzania-International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development; CashewNut Development Project Agreement (Loan No.
1014 TA), June 24, 1974, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment-Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania. Interview with Richard Stern, World Bank (June
3, 1976). The successful bidder for the machinery and consulting services contracts was 01-
tremare S.p.A. which has been involved in selling cashewnut processing machinery to
Tanzania and helping Tanzania develop a profitable, efficient cashewnut processing and ex-
porting business. The new facilities which will be managed by local personnel, will lessen or
eliminate the need for Tanzania to export cashewnuts to India for processing. India has in
the past "squeezed" Tanzania because Tanzania lacked the facilities to locally process its
entire crop. Interview with Dr. Luigi Deserti, President, Oltremare S.p.A. (May 22, 1976).
22 For an example of a firm's response to the Bank's request for details regarding con-
sultancy capabilities and experience, see Letter from A. J. Maier, Planning and Business
Area Director, Plant Protection Division, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. to Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Attention: B. H. deZoysa, Chief, Consult-
ant Section) (July 16, 1974).
24 WORLD BANK, USES OF CONSULTANTS BY THE WORLD BANK AND ITS BORROWERS 12
(April, 1974).
2 Id. at 4
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nale seems apparent-a corporation may design a project or advise a line
of action favoring goods or services of that firm. However, the Bank's
staff indicated that Bank rules are in fact flexible on this point. If a cor-
poration serves as an engineering or design consultant, it is not automati-
cally disqualified from bidding for the tender of goods and services, al-
though such corporation will be "looked at carefully" in the subsequent
bidding stages.28 Despite the rules of the World Bank's Operating Man-
ual, corporations, in practice, apparently have encountered a more auto-
matic disqualification procedure which they would like ameliorated by
the adoption of "less formalistic awarding procedures. '27
International businessmen also criticize the traditional approach, the
interminable analyses, and prolonged bidding procedures used by the
World Bank in its project conceptualization and analysis. Corporate exec-
utives think that excessively long periods are required for the implemen-
tation of Bank projects. International funding agencies generally have
segmented feasibility, design, and construction functions into separate
stages with awards to different organizations. The segmentation of
projects usually results in long intervals between the various stages. Both
varying responsibilities of contractors and passage of time lessen the suc-
cess of a project. The costs of feasibility studies which quickly become
obsolete, changes in conditions, and variations from design to construc-
tion stages further spiral the cost of a project. The separation of responsi-
bilities may give rise to unforeseen additional costs stemming from a de-
sign that may ignore construction processes; the execution of a project
may not consider subsequent operation and maintenance requirements.2
28 Interview with Donald Pickering, World Bank (June 3, 1976). Mr. Pickering advised
the author that in accordance with the procedures of the World Bank, a copy of this section
of the World Bank's Operating Manual could not be made public.
27 IMPRESrr, NOTE ON A NEW APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS, EXECUTIVE COMMrr-
TEE MEETING, INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PROGRAMME 3 (October 30-31, 1975). The behavior of
an organization generally follows preestablished rules and procedures-so-called standard
operating procedures. See G. T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MIS-
SILE CRISIS 81-87 (1971).
S' See, e.g., FIAT S.p.A., DELEGATION REPORT, INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PROGRAM, GEN-
ERAL COMMITTEE MEETING, ICP 1-3 (February 18, 1976). In comment on the interminable
economic analyses, Impresit (Fiat) notes:
In many situations agricultural investment is clearly shown to be convenient or so
patently necessary that protracted, theoretical, debatable and sterile economic
analyses have a function of mere bureaucratic satisfaction, either formal or intel-
lectual. They absorb large expenditures of energy and time and influence only
marginal aspects of operative decisions. Had World agricultural development been
fundamentally directed by traditional economic analyses, the world would still be
almost only forest and desert, and those few economic analyses that have justified
agricultural investments gather dust in filing cabinets, to become obsolete in the
span of a few months.
IMPREsrr (FIAT), NOTE ON A NEW APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTE MEETING, INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PROGRAMME 2 (October 30-31, 1975).
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In several instances, industry attempted to devise new techniques in
conjunction with more flexible public financing sources to overcome the
negative aspects of the traditional procedures. A most notable example is
the Bakolori project in Nigeria which involves the design and construc-
tion of a dam and a supply canal connecting an irrigation and land recla-
mation area. On the Bakolori project, the design and construction respon-
sibilities for the land reclamation and irrigation projects are centered in
one firm, Impresit Bakolori (Nigeria) Ltd., a joint venture composed of
the two shareholders, the Federal Government of Nigeria and Impresit
S.P.A., a consulting implementing arm of Fiat. This arrangement avoids
the gap between design and construction and the concomitant refusal of
any one organization, under traditional procedures, to assume overall re-'
sponsibility. Also, allowing different stages of the project to overlap in
sequencing reduced the time between conception and construction.2 9 Only
a relatively short period of time, slightly over one year, elapsed from the
commencement of feasibility studies to the start of construction of the
Bakolori project. However, the project relied on an eight year FAO feasi-
bility study. Whether the Bank will overcome a tendency to function by
traditional methods and operating manuals, and flexibly respond to pri-
vate sector initiatives and inventiveness is problematic.
The World Bank procedures, moreover, may limit private sector bid-
ding, particularly by smaller firms. One executive sought to secure the
names of the Bank's project managers in a country in order to send
materials to such managers. This attempt met a negative response from
the Bank's staff. To avoid offending the local government by appearing to
promote United States private corporate interests, the Bank refused to
provide the requested names. The corporation was left with three options:
going directly to the country, hiring a local agent with the attendant pos-
sibilities of corruption, or making high-level contacts at the World Bank.
The firm pursued the final alternative to cut through the "red tape."
A significant obstacle exists to multinational firms tapping public
sector moneys, namely, a lack of knowledge by corporations of public sec-
tor project preparation and bidding procedures. Business executives are
slowly gaining experience in dealing with public sector financing organiza-
tions. The Inter-American Development Bank has taken the lead in train-
219 FIAT S.p.A., DELEGATION REPORT, INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PROGRAM, GENERAL COMMIT-
TEE MEETING, ICP 3-6 (February 18, 1976). See also, IMPRESIT, NOTE ON A NEW APPROACH TO
AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE PRO-
GRAMME (October 30-31, 1975). Interview with Dr. V. Bonisconti, Fiat S.p.A. (May 15, 1976).
The Bakolori project also includes a residential complex, training centers for training, facili-
ties for servicing machinery, equipment, and roads, and an electricity network. Although the
project envisages the establishment of agribusiness facilities, such as a sugar factory, tomato
processing plant and rice and flour mills, the contractor has focused its attention on the
dam and irrigation project.
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ing professionals from borrower nations in the identification, selection,
preparation, and execution of bankable projects. These training programs
have not to date included corporations. To meet this need, the manage-
ment of the Inter-American Development Bank is assessing a staff propo-
sal for a joint Inter-American Development Bank-World Bank Agro-In-
dustrial Project Preparation Program which would include observers from
both public and private entities in developed countries who could con-
tribute to the course.3 0 Rather than including executives from private
firms in the regular training programs for trained personnel that are
aimed at meeting the needs of developing nations, public sector agencies
could organize a special course of short duration for private firms' execu-
tives designed to acquaint them with project identification, preparation,
appraisal, and implementation.
In addition to tapping international public sector funds, business has
been actively involved in using national bilateral foreign assistance by in-
dustrialized nations to developing countries as a means of government
subsidization and export promotion.3 1 Expenditure of bilateral develop-
ment assistance funds has generally been tied to the purchase of the
goods and services of the donor country's private sector. Within the con-
text of meeting development needs, or other similar donor guidelines, cor-
porations worked closely with recipient nations. A corporation, under this
system, helped a developing country to draw up and present a proposal to
the corporation's home government which included, of course, products
manufactured and/or services provided by the firm. On more than a few
occasions, a firm also discussed a project with its home government as a
part of the donor government's decision-making process. 3 2
Reacting to criticisms that tied development assistance furthered
corporate objectives rather than social goals in developing countries, sev-
eral countries in Western Europe (e.g., the Netherlands) have untied for-
eign aid. A significant problem still exists. Developing nations lack the
knowledge and expertise to define their problems. Corporations still assist.
recipient countries in defining problems and suggesting the sale of goods
30 Interview with Frank Meissner, Division of Agricultural Development Projects of the
Inter-American Development Bank (June 4, 1976). See also, speech by Frank Meissner, Di-
vision of Agricultural Development Projects, Inter-American Development Bank, Role of
Development Banks in Structuring and Implementing Agricultural Projects in The Interna-
tional Food Delivery Systems Symposium 44-45 (Sept., 1975). (University of California
Berkeley).
31 Earlier critical analyses include H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY, 122-144 (1969). T. HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 87-98 (1971).
See also, M. VON NEUMANN WHITMAN, GOVERNMENT RISK-SHARING IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(1965). See generally, Hyson & Strout, Impact of Foreign Aid on U. S. Exports, 46 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 63 (1968).
32 Interview with W. A. DeJonge, Bureau for External Economic Relations, N. V.
Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken (May 12, 1976).
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and/or services as part of a donor government's new thrust to meet basic
social problems. A recipient nation presents the project to a donor with a
corporation still getting in on the ground floor. An initial sale of goods or
services forms part of a corporation's long-term aim of selling more so-
phisticated goods and services. By assisting a developing country in meet-
ing its basic needs, a firm hopes to gain the goodwill and acceptance of a
government requisite to the later sale of higher profit items.33
IV. NEW STRUCTURAL APPROACHES: SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND
CONSORTIUMS
Business executives have pursued innovative structures to facilitate
participation by multinational firms in the agribusiness sector of devel-
oping countries. Prime examples of possible new techniques are contrac-
tual arrangements linked to the achievement of specified development
goals and multi-firm consortiums. Corporations may increasingly encoun-
ter countries where neither direct foreign equity investment nor current
consulting or management contracts are appropriate. A host government's
policies, an inadequate or excessively risky return, or a combination of
both may block foreign private direct investment or other forms of in-
volvement. The public or private sector of a host nation may regard the
agreements for consulting services and/or management even without any
equity investment as of limited value to the host nation. A nation may
feel that a firm transfers its best technology and management only where
such entity has a financial stake beyond a consulting arrangement. To
utilize the technological, management, production, and marketing exper-
tise in such situations, multinational corporations may suggest the use of
management contracts linked to the achievement of development goals.
Payments under such contracts could be based on both the fulfillment of
a nation's long-term development objectives and the ongoing costs of the
project to the firm. A firm would derive revenue from the achievement of
interim goals during the contract period. Presumably this would act as an
incentive for the company to apply its best expertise. Industry would
have the time and security to perform properly. A nation would have tan-
gible evidence of a firm's progress to meeting specified goals. A govern-
ment may also wish industry to participate in a project through a non-
equity investment. Given a contract of sufficient duration, such an ar-
rangement would evidence a corporation's financial good faith.
3 Id. As an example of its highly sophisticated approach, Philips has stressed that de-
veloping countries need a communications expert. The initial software sales by other firms
will lay the groundwork for hardware sales by Philips. See, N. V. Philips' Gloei-
lampenfabrieken, National Communication and Programming Center, n. d.
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Executives approach agribusiness as a system, with numerous compo-
nents, requiring the expertise of many firms on a project. A systems ap-
proach "conceives of entities as wholes marked off from the enivronment
by boundaries and containing subparts whose interactions are condi-
tioned by the presence of the other subparts (subsystems). The action of
the whole can be understood only by knowledge of the interaction of all
the parts."'3 A systems concept of agribusiness 35 starts from the premise
that the food chain is a seed-to-consumer system linking together actors
and actions. The pieces of the system do not exist in isolation. Sections
taken at one point in the system impact on other components of the sys-
tem. For instance, an irrigation system consists of several subsystems:
storage, transmission, distribution and the extraction of water. Analysis
must, therefore, focus on the linkages and interdependencies of an
agribusiness system.
The commercial applicability of a systems approach to agribusiness
leads in turn to the concept of a multi-company consortium that, from
the outset, would be put together to tackle a problem. A vertically inte-
grated dairy industry project in a developing country might involve the
following inputs from a number of corporations: land cultivation (machin-
ery manufacturers), land fertilization (fertilizer corporations), fodder pro-
34 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT OF AN AD Hoc PANEL OF THE BOARD ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH: A TOOL FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMME
PLANNING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (1976).
31 Agribusiness may best be understood as a total system involving an interaction of
numerous parts. A leading agribusiness academic spokesman defines the agribusiness system
as follows:
An agribusiness commodity system encompasses all the participants involved in
the production, processing, and marketing of a single farm product. Such asystem
includes farm suppliers, farmers, storage operators, processors, wholesalers, and
retailers involved in a commodity flow from initial inputs to the final consumer. It
also includes all the institutions which affect and coordinate the successive stages
of a commodity flow such as the Government, futures markets, and trade
associations.
R. GOLDBERG, AGRIBUSINESS COORDINATION, 3 (1968) as quoted in J. MORRISEY, AGRICUL-
TURAL MODERNIZATION THROUGH PRODUCTION CONTRACTING, 16 (1974). See also, R.
GOLDBERG, AGRIBUSINESS MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs-LATIN AMERICA (1974);
J. AUSTIN, AGRIBUSINESS IN LATIN AMERICA (1974). A systems approach to agribusiness con-
stitutes the central operational policy of the Latin American Agribusiness Corporation S. A.
LAAD attempts to fill gaps in the agribusiness process. For example, LAAD created and
implemented a Miami-based flower forwarding firm after Central American firms financed
by LAAD encountered problems in transferring flowers from one airline to another airline,
or to flower wholesalers. See also, CHECHI Am COMPANY, EVALUATION OP LATIN AMERICAN
AGRmiUSinESs DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Washington 10 (July, 1974) (Submitted to Devel-
opment Bank's Division, Office of Development Resources, Bureau for Latin America,
Agency for International Development. Contract Number AID/CM/otr-C-73-199 Work Or-
der No. 4).
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duction (seed, pesticides and machinery firms), fodder storage and
processing (equipment and farm building companies), dairy cattle
(animal breeders and producers of animal health products), milking areas
(farm building and milking equipment companies), milk processing (milk
processors and container manufacturers), product transportation (trans-
port manufacturers), and waste disposal (waste processors).36 The system
requires, of course, expert coordination for its implementation and opera-
tion. What is needed is an independent, catalytic organization which
could perceive the interdependencies, which few corporations are aware
of, and thereby facilitate the integration process.
The rationality of a systems approach, namely, a project may require
resources beyond the expertise and commitment of any one multinational
firm, regardless of size, belies a number of problems from the standpoint
of both corporations and catalytic organizations. A systems approach may
be easier for a project, such as sugar or pineapple, which aims at local
production and processing for export. American firms, with a position in
the foreign (U.S.) market, are familiar with the system and can purchase
inputs, e.g. fertilizer, at world market prices. Extending the approach to a
local agricultural self-sufficiency in basic crops through an integrated
package of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, equipment and credit)
provided by a number of firms may pose many problems. Corporations
must overcome unfamiliarity with a non-export oriented system. Anti-
trust considerations may also enter into hesitancy of American corpora-
tions to participate in a consortium. Industry also views consortiums as
demanding too much of management time. Legal and financial complexi-
ties are too high for the return obtained.87
In light of these impediments, from the corporate viewpoint, there
were few, successful consortium projects. A notable exception was an agri-
cultural venture designed to reclaim a region of Iran from the desert by
irrigation, while an integrated complex was created for the production,
processing and distribution of field crops and livestock. The consortium,
the International Agribusiness Corporation of Iran, included the Ameri-
can firms (Hawaiian Agronomics Company (International), Chase Inter-
national Investment Corp., and Diamond A Cattle Company), as well as
Mitsui and Co. of Japan, and Iran enterprises (Ahwaz Beet Sugar Factory
and Refinery Company Limited, Iranian Agricultural Development Bank,
and the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority). Hawaiian Agronomics
had been the managing partner of the consortium in which all members
were shareholders. Chase and the Agricultural Development Bank of Iran
were the lenders. Areas of functional authority were segmented-the
36 Interview with J. I. Hendrie, Member, ICP Executive Committee (May 6, 1976).
" Telephone conversation with Charles Dennison, retired Vice President, International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. (June 28, 1976).
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Khuzestan Water and Power Authority leased the land and supplied
water to the project; The Ahwaz refinery processed all sugar beets pro-
duced; Diamond A provided cattle and livestock expertise; Mitsui was
both a supplier to and a purchaser of products from the enterprise. 88
A catalytic organization undertaking a consortium arrangement en-
counters a variety of obstacles. The catalytic group may face two or more
companies with different approaches to the system or the supply of any
one input. Firms may simply disagree. Corporations may also have differ-
ent objectives. A mechanism would be required to resolve such disputes.
Even if two or more firms agree on an approach, the catalytic organiza-
tion must select the firm to provide a given input. To surmount the ob-
stacles of parceling out a project and bringing in firms to handle slices
appropriate to each firm's expertise, requires a staff skilled in project im-
plementation and management. The Citibank International Development
Corp., as a consultant, currently packages multi-corporation agribusiness
projects in developing countries. To undertake these activities Citibank
employs a staff composed of experts in finance (including sources of
financing and corporate finance techniques), mamagement consulting to
make studies and structure deals, and a technical director (a civil engi-
neer) who will interface with construction and engineering experts.39
A catalytic organization would require additional personnel to put to-
gether a consortium involving corporations and public sector financing
thereby increasing an organization's budget. To meet the expertise hur-
dle, an outside consultant could be engaged to implement consortium
projects. The catalytic organization would also be required to get actively
involved in negotiations among the constituent corporations and between
the consortium, a developing nation and a possible public sector financing
source. All of these problems may incline a catalytic organization to avoid
the implem6ntation and management of a consortium project.
58 Interview with Graham Williams, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (June 1,
1976); OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 25 (1975). Letter from
R. W. Mist, Vice President, Hawaiian Agronomics Company (International) to author (July
7, 1976). Another successful consortium is the fertilizer project in India involving Chevron
Chemical Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California), International
Minerals & Chemical Corp., and E.I.D. Parry, Ltd., (a private Indian corporation). For an
analysis of the venture, see W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss
VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS ch. X
(1971). Another joint effort involves a Brazilian subsidiary of the International Basic Econ-
omy Corp. and an Australian seed firm (Arthur Yates & Co. Pty. Ltd.) in the marketing of
pasture seed for beef herds in Brazil. Telephone conversation with J. C. Tyler, Jr., Vice
President, International Basic Economy Corp. (July 13, 1976).
3' Interview with John Botts, Citibank International Development Corp., First National
City Bank (London) (May 3, 1976).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined multinational agribusiness corporations
and the problems they pose for a developing country. Multinational firms
skew a country's developmental priorities and focus on corporate objec-
tives rather than social goals.
Multinational corporations are becoming more flexible in structuring
their activities in the Third World, and new business approaches and ar-
rangements are being employed. Two possible routes exist by which to
channel the agribusiness corporate expertise into projects to provide so-
cial benefits. First is the triangulation strategy in which private manage-
ment, marketing and technological expertise is linked with public sector
financing or national bilateral foreign assistance by industrialized nations.
This helps the multinational firms to reduce the risks and uncertainties
of foreign direct investment. The second is a systems technique and con-
sortium approach. This latter approach grows out of the awareness that
no single corporation may desire or be able to provide all the requisite
expertise necessary to implement a business project.
